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1. Introduction
In the United States the rule of law is practically a civil religion. The rule of law
is guarantor of Americans’ liberties. It protects them from government running
amok. Today the American rule of law is under siege. The challenge does not
come, however, from a Hitler on the right or a Stalin on the left who would overthrow it.2 No. The challenge to the rule of law in America comes from the keepers of the faith, i.e., from its evangelists, apostles, reformers, and just plain disciples. Americans spread the gospel abroad and question whether they keep it at
home.3 Libertarians think the United States needs better rules rather than fewer
rules.4 Reformers see that the American rule of law undermines individual responsibility.5 Disciples see that American rules lead to bad decisions rather than
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2
This is not to belittle, however, that developments in terrorism and technology in this
century, threaten to undermine the rule of law.
3
See Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2006), especially Frank Upham, “Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy,” in id. at
75-104.
4
Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and
the Rule of Law (2011).
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Philip K. Howard, Rule of Nobody: Saving America from dead laws and senseless bureaucracy [in press].
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to good ones.6 Even pious parishioners in the pews perceive that, however well
they believe that it protects individual liberty against tyrannical heads of state,
the American rule of law comes up short in protecting and governing day-today.7 It needs, scholars say, “rethinking.”8
Doubters of the American rule of law religion discern what true believers
do not: the rule of law is not just about liberty. It is also about governing. That
thought was in Americans’ minds at the beginning of the last century when they
sang the second verse of the then recently written and still today popular national
hymn, America the Beautiful: “America, America, God mend thy every flaw.
Confirm thy soul in self-control, Thy liberty in law.” Today, liberty in law has
lost its ring.9
Doubters of the American rule of law religion observe what true believers overlook: an effective rule of law is a law of statutory rules. Judge-made
precedents are secondary. That was in the minds of American lawyers already
125 years ago when the American Bar Association resolved: “The law itself
should be reduced, so far as its substantive principles are settled, to the form of a
statute.”10 Then, even the truest of true believers in judge-made law, James C.
Carter, the preeminent nineteenth century opponent of codification, limited his
claims for the benefits of common law lawmaking to private law, i.e., claims of
rights among individuals, and excluded “our public law, our statutory law, which
relates to the Constitution, organization and administration of the state.”11 Today,
however, American lawyers ignore that truth when they celebrate a contemporary
common law of judicial lawmaking and ignore statutes of legislatures.12
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Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction of Legal Reasoning
(2009). See James R. Maxeiner, “Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad: Putting Justice into
Legal Reasoning,” 11 Washington U. Global Studies L. Rev. (2012) at 55.
7
Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America (2001) at 150-151.
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See, e.g., Robin L. West, “Chapter 2: Rethinking the Rule of Law,” in Robin L. West,
Re-Imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of Formal Equality, Rights and the
Rule of Law (2003), at 13. See also “Symposium: Is the Rule of Law Waning in America?,” 56 DePaul L. Rev. 223-694 (2007) (eighteen essays by twenty-one authors).
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See Michael Kammen, The Spheres of Liberty: Changing Perceptions of Liberty in
American Culture (2001).
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Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (1886) at 72-74.
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Doubters of the American rule of law see two problems which are, in
reality, two sides of the same coin. On the one side of the coin, they see rules of
law that are excessively detailed and deny human judgment in their application.
Rules and not people end up making decisions in matters that lawmakers never
anticipated. The American rule of law today is, says law reformer Philip K.
Howard, a “rule of nobody.” The language of dead legislators governs because
they did not trust judges to carry out less detailed instructions. On the other side
of the coin, doubters see judges that assert supremacy over the texts of statutes.
Justice Antonin Scalia describes the ills that arise when “judges fashion law rather than fairly derive it from governing texts;” instead of following rules, judges
“do what they want.”13 Common law lawmaking undercuts democracy.14 On the
one side of the coin, the law is too certain. On the other side, it is too indeterminate.15
The coin debased by common law lawmaking cannot buy good government. Good government depends on statutes to go by itself. Only then can the
governed and the governors alike apply laws, to themselves and to others using
their common sense without being perplexed by unfathomable rules or being
frustrated by unending procedure. Professor Richard A. Epstein, a libertarian,
prescribes the cure: “make sure that the tasks that are given to the government are
both limited and well-defined, and … let the people who are in charge have the
degree of flexibility needed to carry out their task.”16
Americans can structure a government that works, but it requires courage. To limit and to define the tasks given to government, while allowing flexibility in carrying those tasks out, are matters of legislating. American skills with
legislation are lacking. American skills in writing statutes are deficient. American
skills in interpreting statutes are lacking. American skills in applying statutes are
poor. Americans know that. The world knows that.17 Still, the task is managea13

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
(2012) at 4 and 9.
14
Id. at 3.
15
See West, supra note 8, at 13, 26-31; James R. Maxeiner, “Legal Indeterminacy Made
in America: American Legal Methods and the Rule of Law,” 41 Valparaiso U.L. Rev.
517 (2006) at 517; “Legal Certainty and Legal Methods: A European Alternative to
American Legal Indeterminacy?,” 15 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2007) at 541.
16
Epstein, supra note 4, at 6-7. See Howard, supra note 5 (speaking of “corrals”); James
R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study (1986) at (speaking of “negative binding”).
17
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Regulatory Reform in the
United States (1999) at 48 (“At the heart of the most severe regulatory problems is the
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ble.18 What doubters seek for America is reality abroad. It is a part of a legal
state. Others can govern according to law: what is to stop the United States from
developing good laws?
The rule of law religion and the contemporary common law are the show
stoppers. They so dominate American thinking about law and legal methods that
they leave no ground for better methods to take root.

2. Contemporary Common Law
According to American rule of law religion, the United States is a “common law”
country where judicial precedents are the law and where statutes—even today—
are occasional interlopers.19 The American rule of law religion reflects the late
nineteenth century rule of law popularized by the English jurist Albert Venn
Dicey: common law, common law courts and no discretion in law application.20
“The common law in the Anglo-American world is synonymous for most people
with the rule of law.”21
In the contemporary common law judges are supreme in lawmaking.
Where there is no law or the law is found only in precedents, they have authority
to make binding law, i.e., common law precedents binding in future cases (stare
decisis). Where there are statues, they have authority to decide whether those
laws are consistent with the U.S. Constitution (constitutional or judicial review,
sometimes known as judicial supremacy). Moreover, where there are statutes—
quality of primary legislation. … More so than in other OECD countries, the United
States has found it extremely difficult to improve legislative quality and coherence.”).
18
So said iconic contracts scholar Samuel Williston already in 1914. See Samuel Williston. “The Uniform Partnership Act with some other remarks on other Uniform Commercial Laws, An Address before the Law Association of Philadelphia December 18, 1914”
(1915) at 2 reprinted in 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 196 (1915) at 197.
19
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Revised Edition
(2004) at 71. For views skeptical of common law carryover see, e.g., Calvin Woodard,
“Is the United States a Common Law Country?” in Essays on English Law and the American Experience (Elisabeth A. Cawthon and David E. Narrett, eds., 1994) at 120; Gordon
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969) at 291-305; For
views skeptical of the utility of the common law, see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, “The Failure of the Common Law,” 36 Ariz. St. L. J. 765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, “Do Cases
Make Bad Law?”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006); Gordon Tullock, The Case Against the
Common Law (1997).
20
Chapter 4 “Rule of Law,” in Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law
of the Constitution (1885).
21
John V. Orth, “Common Law and United States Legal Tradition,” in The Oxford Companion to American Law (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 2002) 127, 129.
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which today, is just about everywhere—judges assert that they have authority to
determine the meaning of statutes not only for the cases they are presently deciding, but for future cases (statutory precedent or statutory stare decisis).22
Contemporary common law thus extends judicial supremacy over the
constitutional validity of statutes to judicial supremacy over the meaning and application of statutes. It makes judicial precedents the starting points for legal reasoning rather than statutory texts. It demonetizes legislation. It encourages legislators to leave to judges the last word in making law: judges will take it anyway.23 It compromises governing by law.
Contemporary common law concentrates on litigation. In litigation judges are authorized—indeed, they are required—to decide rights between two competing parties before the court. Only in their own world of judicial supremacy,
however, do judges in such cases have legal authority or legislative legitimacy to
decide, not just the cases before them, but what will be law in future cases decided according to the statutes they apply.24
Applying contemporary common law in statutory cases makes a mockery
of the idea that law is a set of democratically established rules, applied to the
facts of cases, by those subject to law and by those who govern.25 Contemporary
common law in its concentration on litigation dovetails well with the concentration of the American rule of law religion on guaranteeing individual rights to the
practical exclusion of good governing. The contemporary common law was a bad
22

See Scalia & Garner, supra note 13, at 5; Peter L. Strauss, “The Common Law
and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 243 (1998)
23
See John V. Orth, “The Persistence of the Common Law,” in John V. Orth, How Many
Judges does it take to make a Supreme Court? And Other Essays on Law and the Constitution (2006) at 73, 83 (“a statute is characteristically approached through prior cases that
applied it”); at 85 (“Where the common law persisted, not only did it lull the legislature
into inactivity, it also dulled its mind when it did act. … [A] laxity made tolerable by the
possibility of judicial remediation.”). See also Scalia, J., dissenting in Sykes v. United
States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (“Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nitty-gritty.”
24
See, e.g., 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Procedure,
(1866) at 704-706 (chap. LIX, §§ 1030-1032); William G. Hammond, “Notes to Laws of
England, No. 30,” in 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (William G. Hammond, ed., 1890) at 213-226; American Bar Association, Report of the
Committee on Legal Education Presented at the Annual Meeting in Boston, August 26,
1891 (1891) at 44. See also Orth, “Can the Common Law Be Unconstitutional?” in Orth,
supra note 23, at 53, 61-62.
25
See Scalia & Garner, supra note 13, at 3-5, 83, 509, 517.
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choice of American law when judges adopted it gradually in the course of the
nineteenth century. That it did not work well was amply proven by American
government in the twentieth century. That it should not be the future of American
law in the twenty-first century is the challenge that the doubters make.
Faced with the evidence of failure of the contemporary common law,
true believers find solace in saying that that is the price we pay for a government
under law. No other way can work. Our American ways must be the best—at
least for us Americans (American exceptionalism). Received wisdom clings to a
view of history that holds that this is the way Americans have always done law.
So the late Justice Brennan introduced American law to neophytes with the conventional view of American legal history:
In the early years of the republic ‘American’ law was, in
fact, largely English common law. It was transplanted by a group
of former colonial subjects who had begun their revolution in order to secure their ‘rights as Englishmen.’ In the nineteenth century, legal innovation occurred mostly at the state level, as common law courts adapted old doctrines to the circumstances of a
new and growing nation. In [the twentieth] century, the momentum of reform began to shift to the federal government [and to]
… a coming supremacy of federal law [and] federal legislation.26
Received wisdom is myth. Its view of history is false.27 What the American colonists brought with them and what they sought presents no monolithic picture:
early America was a land of “many legalities.”28 The picture of common law in
colonial America was complex. The colonies varied from colony-to-colony in
what they adopted. None adopted common law wholesale; each adapted it to local conditions. They chose among common law rules (e.g., land tenures, crimes
and punishments, forms of action) and common law institutions (e.g., courts, jury). The rudimentary nature of courts and law practice, as well as limitations on
law reporting—there were no printed American law reports and English reports
26

William J. Brennan, Jr., “Introduction” in New York University School of Law, Fundamentals of American Law 1, 3 (1996).
27
It may be historically inaccurate, but it still has such a hold on the American legal mind
that even a judge and scholar who suggests that, relegates that truth to a footnote. Guido
Calebresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1980) at 185 n. 10 (“I would hasten to
add here that I am not really concerned with the historical accuracy of this tradition, of
this ‘received wisdom.’”).
28
See, e.g., The Many Legalities of Early America (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H.
Mann, eds., 2001); William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, Vol. I,
The Chesapeake and New England 1607-1660 ( 2008), Vol. II, The Middle Colonies and
the Carolinas, 1660-1730 (2012).
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were hard to come by—made adoption of eighteenth century common law methods (known as “declaring law”) difficult. Of course, they could not have adopted
contemporary common law methods (known as lawmaking), for those methods
were yet to be developed.29 Before the Revolution there were no published American precedents, but there many written laws.
Received wisdom ignores centuries of Americans searching for liberty
and common good in written law.
In the seventeenth century, even before the Pilgrims went ashore on the
American Continent, aboard the Mayflower anchored in Massachusetts Bay, they
agreed in the Mayflower Compact to
Combine ourselves together into a Civil Body Politic, for our
better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends
aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute and frame
such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and
Offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and
convenient for the general good of the Colony, unto which we
promise all due submission and obedience.
Soon colonists in Massachusetts adopted written laws. The preamble of the
Lawes and Libertyes of Masschusetts of 1647 colorfully explains why: “a Common-wealth without lawes is like a Ship without rigging and steeradge.”30 They
knew that written laws—and not precedents—are how societies run and guide
themselves. Their leaders provided a book of laws to “satisfie your longing expectation, and frequent complaints for want of such a volume to be published in
print: wherin (upon every occasion) you might readily see the rule which you
ought to walke by.”
In the eighteenth century, founders of the American republic, such as
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, sought a “government of laws and not of
men.” Their nineteenth successors, Justice Joseph Story, President Abraham Lincoln and codifier David Dudley Field, looked to written law to govern. Americans legislated. Constitutional conventions created and amended state constitutions: in the first one hundred and ten years, to 1887, according to one count, one
hundred four state constitutions and two hundred and fourteen partial amend29

See Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (2nd ed., 1894) at 75-80. See also note 24
supra (giving other authorities rejecting theory of common law lawmaking and accepting
declaring law theory).
30
The Lawes and Libertyes of Massachusetts (1847). See Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop (3rd ed., 2007) 156-160.
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ments.31 Every state legislature codified, revised or compiled its statutes. Civic
leaders celebrated America’s heritage of written laws at annual Fourth of July
convocations. Civics text books taught of democratically adopted statutes. An
“orgy of statute making” is nothing new: that is how modern democratic governments govern.32
In 1876, the North American Review, then under the editorship of Henry
Adams and possibly the nation’s most important intellectual magazine, published
in its commemoration of the centennial of the American republic: “The great fact
in the progress of American jurisprudence which deserves special notice and reflection is its tendency towards organic statute law and towards the systematizing
of law; in other words, towards written constitutions and codification.”33 A competing commemorative volume sponsored by Harpers Monthly Magazine, observed that “The art of administering government according to the directions of a
written constitution may fairly be named among the products of American
thought and effort during our century.”34 That of which rule of law doubters today dream was thought the American exceptionalism of the day:
Our idea is that … all the powers of government, all the authority which society can rightly exercise towards individuals, are
originally vested in the masses of the people; that the people
meet together (by their delegates) to organize a government, and
freely decide what officers they will have to act for them in making and administering laws, and what the powers of these officers shall be. These written directions of the people, declaring
what their officers may do and what they may not, form the constitution. The idea, in its practical development, is American.35
With written constitutions go written laws. The Harper’s commemoration continued: “The readiness of American Legislatures to codify or systematize the
laws is a noticeable feature. … There does not appear to be any state, with per-

31

Henry Hitchcock, American State Constitutions: A Study of their Growth (1887) at 1314.
32
Contrast, Guido Calebresi, A Common Law for an Age of Statutes (1980), at 1.
33
George Tucker Bispham, “Law in America, 1776-1876,” in North American Review,
vol. 122 (January 1876) 154, at 174 [emphasis in original].
34
Benjamin Vaughn Abbott, “American Jurisprudence,” in The First Century of the Republic: A Review of American Progress (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1876), at 434,
437.
35

Id. at 438.
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haps the exception of Pennsylvania and Tennessee, which does not possess a
codification or revision of the laws made since the commencement of 1860.”36
Even as most Americans were looking to legislative rules, from the ranks
of judges and legal practitioners came another vision: judge-made law and judicial supremacy. According to legal historian Kermit Hall, “the single most significant feature in nineteenth-century American legal culture was the steady rise of
judicial authority.”37 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the newly
emerging legal professions combined to assert contemporary common law and
judicial supremacy. Already in 1870 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. claimed that “It
is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards.”38 Come 1915 Samuel Williston, iconic contracts scholar of
the day, reported the triumph of contemporary common law lawmaking over
statute lawmaking: “Codification has an ugly sound to most American lawyers.
We have been trained to believe that no code can be expressed with sufficient
exactness, or can be sufficiently elastic to fulfill adequately the functions of our
common law.”39 On the eve of the nation’s sesquicentennial in 1926 the consen36

Id. at 451.
Kermit L. Hall, “History of American Law: Antebellum through Reconstruction, 18011877,” in Oxford Companion to American Law (Kermit Hall, ed., 2002) 374, at 381.
Those with foreign experiences did not, however, judge American efforts at statutory
lawmaking to be unique or effective. They saw the coming of judicial supremacy. See,
e.g., “German Legislation,” 10 Am. L. Rev. (1875) 270, at 280-281 (“The results which
have made a favorable impression [in Germany], are due to what may be called an extension of statutory in proportion to judicial legislation. But no one in America who looks to
improvement in the law looks in this direction. That permanent interest in the well-being
of society which is the foundation of law and good government is less and less represented in our legislative bodies. They have fallen under the control of private and local interests and questions of the moment. Like their spirit, their methods and traditions become
less adapted to produce valuable results, and statutes are accordingly more careless and
short-lived. So great is this deterioration, and the consequent loss of public respect and
influence, that the question has been raised as to the ultimate end of these bodies, which
seems almost approaching. … The authority which has slipped from their hands has
passed into those of the courts.”) Generally on legislative or judicial supremacy, see the
works of Charles Groves Haines, inter alia, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (2d ed. 1932); “Legislative, Judicial or Executive Supremacy,” Chapter XV, in Charles
Grove Haines & Bertha Moser Haines, Principles and Problems of Government (3rd ed..
1934).
38
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Codes and the Arrangement of the Law,” 5 Am. L. Rev. 1
(1870). See Frederick Schauer, “Do Cases Make Bad Law?,” 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883
(2006) at 885.
39
Samuel Williston. The Uniform Partnership Act with some other remarks on other Uniform Commercial Laws, An Address before the Law Association of Philadelphia December 18, 1914 (1915) at 1-2, reprinted in 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 196 (1915). The new legal
37
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sus of the American Bar Association’s meeting in London was that to adopt a
code was an un-American attempt “to supplant the parent Common Law” and “to
forsake our English heritage and follow the lead of Imperial Rome.”40 In just fifty
years between the nation’s centennial in 1876 and its sesquicentennial in 1926
lawyers, judges and law teachers took over the legal system to run it as their
own.41
By the time the bicentennial celebration rolled around in 1976, the ABA
commemorative volumes did not even note the triumph of common law over
written law; they simply assumed it.42 At the turn of this century in 2000 the
ABA commemorative volume in its “Principles” section at book’s outset claimed
that “The common law provides the tools and flexibility to allow the law to continue to serve the needs of a diverse society in a world of rapid change and tech-

“science” of Langdell had no room for statutes, where judicial decisions were the exclusive subject of scientific study.
40
J. Carroll Hayes, “The Visit to England of the American Bar Association,” in The
American Bar Association London Meeting 1924: Impressions of Its Social, Official, Professional and Juridical Aspects as Related by Participants in Contest for Most Enlightening Review of Trip (1925) 9, at 15.
41
The shift is evident in the institutional history of the American Bar Association. The
ABA was founded in in the spirit of statutes. Article I of its Constitution provided that
one of the Association’s three objects was to promote “the uniformity of legislation
throughout the Union.” American Bar Association, Call for a Conference, Proceedings of
Conference, First Meeting of the Association; Officers, Members, etc. (1878) at 16 (as
proposed), at 30 (as adopted). Article III required that the President open each annual
meeting with an address on the “most noteworthy changes in statute law … during the
preceding year.” Id. at 18, 32. On the second day of the first meeting, the first elected
president, in the second sentence of his first address, expounded on the “noble” purpose
of the Association “to codify and harmonize” the law.” Id. at 32. The ABA was, however, a creature of its time. Its devotion to statutes flagged and its fascination with judicial
supremacy jumped. In 1913 the Association amended its Constitution to drop the requirement that the President open the annual meeting with an address on the most noteworthy statutes. In 1919 it adopted a new constitution that modified its object to seek not
only “uniformity of legislation” but also “judicial decision throughout the nation.”
42
See Harry W. Jones, “The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and
American Variations,” in Political Separation and Legal Community 91 (American Bar
Association, Common Faith and Common Law, Papers Prepared for the Bicentennial
Observance, Harry W. Jones, ed., 1976); Legal Institutions Today: English and American
Approaches Compared unnumbered vii-viii (American Bar Association, Common Faith
and Common Law, Papers Prepared for the Bicentennial Observance, Harry W. Jones,
ed. 1977).
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nological development.”43 Common law and rule of law are held to be practically
one and the same.44
Americans need to start over. They need a legal state that works. The
failures of the American legal system and the successes of foreign systems are
not reasonably deniable.45 The contemporary common law of judicial supremacy
over statutes is not an essential part of American law or of American liberty. Judicial supremacy is not a part of American legal DNA. Legislative supremacy
has a better claim. It was present in the legislative work of John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson.46

3. Adams and Jefferson as Legislators
“They formed a system of government, and a code of laws, such
as the wisdom of man had never before devised.”
Sheldon Smith
Eulogy Pronounced at Buffalo New York July 22nd, 182647
The American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 for many people
around the world presents the premier principles of protection of individual

43

Common Law, Common Values, Common Rights, Essays on Our Common Heritage by
Distinguished British and American Authors at viii (American Bar Association, 2000).
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., “German Legislation,” supra note 35, at 283 (“Americans abroad are apt to
fall into one of two classes; either to be irritated, in the presence of an older civilization,
into a spread-eagle state of mind, or else to fall down and worship it. The writer will be
acquitted of belonging to the former, and no declaration of independence will save him if
he is thought to have dealt in too rosy colors. Political institutions [in Germany] are offensive, but he admits a feeling of satisfaction in seeing or thinking he sees the law,
which is every man's attendant through life, walking by his side in modern dress, and
speaking a language which everyone understands.”). See also James R. Maxeiner with
Gyooho Lee and Armin Weber, Failures of American Civil Justice in International Perspective (2011).
46
See A. London Fell, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State, Volume Six: American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import and Foreground, Book I: Foundations (to Early 19 th Century) (2004).
47
Sheldon Smith, “Eulogy Pronounced at Buffalo New York July, 22 nd, 1826,” in A Selection of Eulogies, Pronounced in the Several States, in Honor of those Illustrious Patriots and Statesmen, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson (1826) at 91, 94.
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rights.48 And in the protection of individual rights, Americans see the essence of
the rule of law.49
More than any other two people, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson
brought the Declaration of Independence in being. They acted to make the republican ideals of the Declaration reality in law. For Adams it was a frame of government; for Jefferson it was the nuts and bolts of government itself. In fall 1779
Adams drafted the Constitution and Form of Government of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, which is still law today. There he coined the phrase of a “government of laws, not of men” that into the twentieth century described what
Americans today call the rule of law. From fall 1776 through spring 1779 Jefferson wrote the laws for a republican government for Virginia. He provided legislation for reformation of the law of the nation’s most populous state. James Madison described Jefferson’s reformation as “a mine of legislative wealth, and a
model of statutory composition.”50
In the world of Adams and Jefferson, law is about legislation and government is about governing. Written laws decide principles beforehand and authorize governors and governed alike to decide according to those principles.
Democratically selected legislatures are supreme and not judges. States have
governments of laws and not of men.
True believers in the contemporary common law cannot accept that the
founders’ world revolved around written law and not around common law,
around legislators and not around judges, and around governing and not around
resolving disputes. So one writes:
The leaders of the American Revolution, such as John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson talked grandly about breaking with the
European past and starting “a new order of the world.” But when
the Constitutional Convention met in a steamy summer in Phila48

See, e.g., Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, “The Significance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the European Union and the United States,” 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. (2010) at 229,
231, 240 and 272 (citation omitted) (“the law of the United States incorporates the most
radical principles of individualism and liberty ever known to man.”)
49
American Bar Association Section on International and Comparative Law, The Rule of
Law in the United States: A Statement by the Committee to Cooperate with the International Commission of Jurists (1958) at 10 (the rule of law is “the body of precepts of fundamental individual rights permeating institutions of government … by which such precepts may be applied to make those rights effective.”).
50
James Madison to Samuel Harrison Smith, November 4, 1826, in The Writings of
James Madison, Volume 1819-1836 (Gaillard Hunt, 1910) at 256, 257-258.
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delphia in 1787, it was with the assumption that English common law would continue unchanged in the United States.51
Today scholars look beyond such false received wisdom. They tell us that that
the state constitutions of the time, together with the Declaration of Independence
“most authentically document the irreversible American commitment to Republicanism in 1776.”52 They perceive in Jefferson’s legislation “a rare and comprehensive view of how a founder envisioned an actual republican society.”53

4. Adams’ Constitution: The Frame of Government
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time
when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to
live. … When before the present epoch, had three millions of
people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the
wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive?
John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776)
John Adams wrote the oldest constitution that is still in force today: the
1780 Constitution and Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.54 In it Adams combined “A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” as Part the First, and “The Frame of
Government,” as Part the Second. He placed the idea of “a government of laws
and not of men” literally between the two Parts.

51

Norman F. Cantor, Imagining the Law: Common Law and the Foundations of the
American Legal System (1997) at 354. Cf. William D. Bader, “Mediations on the Original: James Madison, Framer with Common Law Intentions—Ramifications in the Contemporary Supreme Court,” 20 Vt. L. Rev. 5 (1995).
52
See, e.g., Willi Paul Adams, “The Liberal and Democratic Republicanism of the First
American State Constitutions,” in Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the
German States,1750-1850 (2002) at 127.
53
Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic
(1987) at 62.
54
With justification Adams boasted: “I made a constitution for Massachusetts, which
finally made the Constitution of the United States.” As quoted in Robert F. Williams, The
Law of American State Constitutions (2009) at 36.
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Chronicle. That Adams had the opportunity to draft the Massachusetts
Constitution is a remarkable story in itself. An earlier attempt at a constitution for
the state had failed; Massachusetts was the last state to follow the April 1776 call
of the Continental Congress to write a state constitution. But Adams left the
United States in 1778 for ten years in Europe. In that decade, he was home for
just three months. Yet it was in those three months that Adams was elected to the
be a delegate to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, the Convention
assembled, appointed Adams to the Committee to write the State Constitution,
and Adams, in September and October 1779, wrote it. Before the Convention
could approve his draft, he was gone for Europe.
In writing the Constitution Adams relied on his 1776 pamphlet Thoughts
on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the American Colonies.55 That
pamphlet brought him acclaim, contributed to his role in the Declaration of Independence and made him someone for others to consult in drafting their state constitutions. It was there that he wrote that “the very definition of a republic ‘is an
empire of laws, and not of men’” and that “a republic is the best of governments.” He took the term from James Harrington’s Oceana. For Massachusetts
Adams wrote of a government and not an empire of laws.
Adams wrote Thoughts on Government to give to other Americans on
how they might create constitutions and institutions for governing the new states
coming into being in 1776. He began by rejecting Pope’s famous aphorism “The
forms of government let fools contest: That which is best administered is best.”
Adams said no: “Pope flattered tyrants too much …. Nothing could be more fallacious than this.” The form of government does make a difference, he asserted.
“Nothing is more certain, from the history of nations and the nature of men, that
some forms of government are better fitted for being well-administered than others.” And so, Adams asked: “As good government is an empire of laws, how
shall your laws be made?” Three years later he gave his answer in his draft of the
Massachusetts Constitution.56
Adams’ Constitution and Frame of Government. It is anachronistic to describe a document of 1780 in terms that were not to achieve currency for another
55

It, together with The Report of a Constitution, or Form of Government, for the Commonwealth of Massachsetts (1779), are conveniently reprinted in The Revolutionary Writings of John Adams, Selected and with a Foreword by C. Bradley Thompson (2000) at
287-293 and at 297-322 respectively.
56
Except as noted, references here are to the final language of the adopted 1780 constitution and not to that of Adams’ 1779 draft. Differences between the two with respect to
specific sections cited are believed minor unless discussed.
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century. Yet Adam’s Constitution anticipates the balanced approach of a legal
state which accommodates individual rights and governing together more than it
foreshadows the individual rights-focused American rule of law. It looks more
like a legal state founded on statute law and a principle of legality than it does
like a rule of law content with judge-made law and inherent authority. It anticipates laws that are integrated and stable that people can follow more than an ever-changing mix of judicial precedents. It is for the legislature to state the laws,
for the executive to carry them out, and for the judiciary to accept the reasoned
judgments of both.
The preamble of Adams’ constitution begins stating that government
balances common good and individual rights: “The end of the institution,
maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence of the
body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the
power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights and the blessings
of life.”
The preamble’s second paragraph states the means to accomplish this
end: “certain laws for the common good.” So it is “a duty of the people … to
provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial interpretation, and a faithful execution of them.” It is through these written laws, “that
everyman may at all times, find his security in them.” The preamble concludes
“We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, … do agree upon, ordain and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution of the commonwealth of Massachusetts.”
Adams’ “government of laws and not of men” is part of the statement of
the principle of a separation of powers among legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government. It occupies a mediating place between individual rights
and common good. In the Constitution it literally stands between two parts, Part
the First, Declaration of Rights, and Part the Second, Frame of Government. Adams, in his draft placed it at the beginning of Part the Second, Frame of Government. The Constitutional Convention moved it to the end of Part the First. Where
Adams in his draft only provided that “the legislative, executive and judicial
power shall be placed in separate departments,” the Convention in the final version, besides moving the provision from one part to the other, declared that each
of the branches “shall never exercise” powers of the other.
Written law. Adams’ Constitution provides a frame for statute law and
governing. Chapter I, Section I, Article IV of Part the Second, the Frame of Gov-
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ernment, gives the legislature authority “to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of this commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and
of the subjects of the same, and for the necessary support and defence of the government thereof.” Article XXII of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights, calls
on the legislature frequently to assemble “for address[ing] of grievances, for correcting, strengthening, and confirming the laws, and for making new laws, as the
common good may require.”
Adams’ Constitution does not contemplate contemporary judge-made
law or judicial supremacy. Article X of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights
provides: “In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by any
other laws than those to which their constitutional representative body have given
their consent.” Article XX adds: “The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for.”
Adams’ Constitution commands “standing laws” to protect the people
from rapid changes in law. Article X of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights
provides: “Every individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws.” Later
Adams explained that a constant changing of the laws though judicial decision or
through legislation denies the people the benefit of law.57
Adams’ constitution anticipates laws that are coordinated one with another. Article 6 of Part the Second, the Frame of Government, avoids a gap in
law by providing that “All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used,
and approved in the province, colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually
practiced on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to
58
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1 John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America ... (3rd ed 1797) at 141 (“Instead of being permanent, and affording constant protection to the lives, liberties, and properties of the citizens, will be alternately the sport of
contending factions, and the mere vibrations of a pendulum. From the beginning to the
end it will be a government of men, now of one set, and then of another; but never a government of laws.”)
58
On the idea generally, see Karl Riesenhuber, “English common law versus German
Systemdenken? Internal versus external approaches,“ 7 Utrecht L. Rev., (January 2001) at
Issue 1, available at www.utrechtlawreview.org.
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the rights and liberties contained in this constitution.” To assure consistency
Chapter III, Article II gives executive and legislative branches “authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.” Article XXIX of Part the First, the
Declaration of Rights calls for “an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice.”
Law for governing. Adams’ constitution looks for a government that will
govern according to law. It does not limit the executive branch to acting only in
response to explicit statutory direction. For example, Chapter II Section I Article
IV of Part the Second, the Frame of Government, provides that “The governor
shall have authority, from time to time, at his discretion, to assemble and call together the councillors of this commonwealth for the time being; and the governor, with the said councillors, or five of them at least, shall and may, from time to
time, hold and keep a council, for the ordering and directing the affairs of the
commonwealth, agreeably to the constitution and the laws of the land.” Later
Adams explained: “The executive power is properly the government; the laws are
a dead letter until an administration begins to carry them into execution.”59
Adams’ Constitution comes close to anticipating a requirement of statutory authority for government action, i.e., a principle of legality. Article XVIII of
Part the First, the Declaration of Rights, provides that the people “have a right to
require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observation of
them [i.e. fundamental principles of the constitution], in the formation and execution of the laws necessary for the good administration of the commonwealth.” It
allows for exceptions to rights, such as search warrant may issue, and soldiers
may be quartered in homes, but only “with the formalities, prescribed by the
laws” or “in a manner ordained by the legislature.”60 Government officers are to
swear to carry out their duties “agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution and the laws of the commonwealth.”61
Adams’ Constitution sets out a frame of a government of laws and not of
men, i.e., a legal state. But what would an American legal state look like? Jefferson’s legislation suggests one such state.
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John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America ..., vol. 1 (3rd ed 1797), at 372.
60
Declaration of Rights, Arts. XIV and XXVII, respectively.
61
Frame of Government, Chap. VI.
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5. Jefferson’s Legislation: A Government of Laws for

the Commonwealth of Virginia
When I left Congress in 76, it was in the persuasion that our
whole code must be reviewed, adapted to our republican form of
government, and, now that we had no negatives of Councils,
Governors & Kings to restrain us from doing right, that it should
be corrected in all its parts, with a single eye to reason, & the
good of those for whose government it was framed.
Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography62
Jefferson’s lawmaking from 1776 to 1779 is unparalleled in American history.
No American legislator before or since has accomplished so much of such importance in such a short period of time. In three weeks in June 1776 he drafted
the Declaration of Independence. In three years following he drafted the laws for
a republican government.”63 In the words of a contemporary biographer Jefferson
created “a model for other states” and “invented the United States of America.”64
His vision was of a government of laws, not of judges.
Chronicle. When Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence in
June 1776, on his mind he had as much building a government of laws as declaring rights and independence.65 Upon arrival in Philadelphia in May for congress,
he wrote a friend back home that the government to be established was “the
whole object of the present controversy.” If that government were no good, independence would be pointless. It would be just as well to accept “the bad one offered to us from beyond the water without the risk & expence of contest.”66 In
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The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790, Together with a Summary of the
Chief Events in Jefferson’s Life (Edited by Paul Leicester Ford, 1914; New Introduction
by Michael Zuckerman, 2005) at 67.
63
Lerner, supra note 53, at 61 writes of “Jefferson’s grand design to make the promise of
the Declaration a reality.”
64
Willard Sterne Randall, Thomas Jefferson: A Life (1993), at 306.
65
The Declaration itself demonstrates the importance that Jefferson placed on legislation.
All of the first named grounds for independence are charges of bad government and not
of violations of individual rights. The very first (of many) reads: “he has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.”
66
Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, May 16, 1776, in 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Vol.
1, 1760 to 1776) (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1950), at 292.
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distant Philadelphia he worked as hard on a constitution for Virginia as on a declaration of a United States. To his life-long frustration, his draft arrived too late.67
In July and August 1776 as Jefferson remained in Philadelphia he was in
correspondence with Edmund Pendleton, who would soon be first speaker of the
new Virginia House of Delegates. In one letter Pendleton urged Jefferson to return home as Jefferson was needed “much in the Revision of our Laws and forming a new body.”68 In another Pendleton asked Jefferson to elaborate on his plans
for changes in land tenures, elections, suffrage and penal law. Did Jefferson really intend, Pendleton asked, “to relax all Punishments and rely on virtue and the
Public good as Sufficient to promote Obedience to the laws.”69
No work was of greater urgency for Jefferson than his legislation. He expected the war to be short. He did not stay in Philadelphia a moment longer than
he had to. He rushed home to Virginia. A republican state needed republican
laws. “It can never be too often repeated,” he later wrote,” that the time for fixing
every essential right on a legal basis is when our rulers are honest, and ourselves
united. From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill.”70
No work had more substance for Jefferson than building a government of
laws. He wrote in his autobiography, “I knew that our legislation under the regal
government had many vicious points which urgently required reformation, and I
thought I could be of more use in forwarding that work. I therefore retired from
my seat in Congress on the 2d. day of Sep., resigned it, and took my place in the
legislature of my state.’”71 When a messenger reached him in Virginia with a
Congressional commission to join Benjamin Franklin on the critical mission to
France, Jefferson took three days to think it over—keeping the messenger waiting—and finally declined the appointment.
From October 1776, when Jefferson joined the state legislature, until
June 1779, when he became governor, Jefferson did little else than work on legislation. His work took two forms: (1) drafting bills on particular subjects, e.g.,
67

See Merrill D. Peterson, “The Virginia Constitution,” in Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas
Jefferson & the New Nation: A Biography (1970) at 100-107.
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1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (1760 to 1776), supra note 66, at 471, 472.
69
Pendleton to Jefferson, Aug. 10, 1776, 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (1760 to
1776), supra note 66, at 488, 490. See also Pendleton to Jefferson, August 3, 1776, id. at
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civil justice, property law, the established church, importation of slaves, and naturalization; and (2) systematic review and reform of Virginia law.72 The latter is
known as the “Revisal.” The Revisal was literally two bundles of 126 bills that
the Virginia House Committee on Revision under Jefferson’s leadership prepared
from October 1776 to June 1779.73
Jefferson on joining the legislature lost no time in getting to work on
building a government of laws. On Monday, October 7, 1776 he took his seat.
Within the week, he had three major pieces of legislation underway. On Friday,
October 11, he obtained leave to bring in a bill to establish courts of justice. For
that work alone he has been recognized “as the preeminent architect of Virginia’s
judiciary.”74 On Saturday the 12th, he obtained leave to bring in two bills: a “Bill
to Enable Tenants in Fee Tail to Convey Their Lands in Fee Simple”75 and a
“Bill for the Revision of the Laws.”76 On Monday, the 14th, he introduced both
bills. The former, was the first of his “great reform bills, which he hoped would
destroy the foundations of an aristocracy of wealth.” It was the less important of
the two!77 The legislature adopted it on Saturday, November 1, without substantial change. Already on the Wednesday, the 23rd, it had approved the Bill for the
Revision of the laws. Americans speak of a president’s first hundred days in office. Jefferson, in office only as state legislator, in a scant twenty-six days, overturned the common law of land tenures, began creation of a new set of courts,
and authorized a total overhaul of Virginia law.
November 3, 1776 the Assembly appointed the Committee of five to reform Virginia law. By giving the younger Jefferson the most votes, it made him
de facto chair. Of the four other members, it was Jefferson’s former law teacher,
George Wythe, who contributed most to the revision.78 The Act creating the
Committee gave it “full power and authority to revise, alter, amend, repeal or
introduce all or any of the said laws, to form the same into bills, and report them
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2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Volume 2, 1777 to 18 June 1779, Including the
Revisal of the Laws, 1776-1786 ) (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1950), at 306.
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Id. at 306-307.
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1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (1760 to 1776), supra note 66, at 605.
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Id. at 560.
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Id. at 561.
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The other members were Edmund Pendleton (Speaker of the House), George Mason
(drafter of the state constitution), and Thomas Ludwell Lee. Soon the committee lost Mason (to resignation) and Lee (to death). Although Pendleton remained to join the final
report, Jefferson and Wythe did most of the work originally assigned to him.
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to the next meeting of the General Assembly.” The charge to the committee—
written by Jefferson—was expansive:
Whereas the later change which hath of necessity been
introduced into the form of government in this country, it is become also necessary to make corresponding changes in the laws
heretofore in force, many of which are inapplicable to the powers of government as now organized, others are founded on principles heterogeneous to the republican spirit, others which, long
before such change, had been oppressive to the people, could yet
never be repealed while the regal power continued, and others,
having taken their origin while our ancestors remained in Britain,
are not so well adapted to our present circumstances of time and
place, and it is also necessary to introduce certain other laws,
which, though proved by the experience of other states to be
friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind, we have not heretofore been permitted to adopt .…”79
The Committee presented its report June 18, 1779. Owing to the war and the
British invasion of Virginia, the Assembly did not take up the report until years
later. In 1784 it ordered the report printed. By then Jefferson was away for a five
year mission in Europe.
In Jefferson’s absence it was James Madison who brought Jefferson’s
legislation to the Assembly and took over sponsorship from 1785 to 1787. Madison’s central role in presenting Jefferson’s anti-common law revision to the Virginia Assembly just months before the 1787 convocation of the U.S. Constitutional Convention contradicts the claim that the Convention convened with the
assumption that English common law would continue unchanged in the United
States.80
October 31, 1785 Madison introduced 118 of the report’s 126 bills. In
that session the legislature adopted thirty-five bills and put the remainder over to
the October 1786 session. In the October 1786 session Madison secured the
adoption of another twenty-three. At the end of that session, on January 2, 1787,
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the Assembly with Madison’s support referred the balance of Jefferson’s proposal for updating to a new committee of revisors and for future action.81
Jefferson’s government of laws. Jefferson has rightly been called Jefferson the legislator, Jefferson the lawmaker and Jefferson the law giver. Just as
Jefferson’s contemporaries Catherine the Great, Frederick the Great and Napoleon are remembered for their legislation, so too should Jefferson be remembered
for his. His work was no less impressive nor was it less extensive. And, except
for Catherine’s Proposal for a New Code, he got there first. Moreover, he did the
work himself! Yet Jefferson’s legislation is unknown among American lawyers.
Law schools pay it no mind.82
Laymen debate whether the Revisal was “a complete codification” or a
“compilation of laws in force.”83 It was more than the latter and closer to the
former. The former no man or two men alone could have accomplished in the
three years Jefferson and Wythe had.
The enormity of the work that Jefferson and Wythe undertook is hard to
appreciate even for lawyers. Lawyers work with one case at a time. In counseling
they advise how they see the law in one or a handful of fact situations. In litigating they argue for one view that they see as benefiting their client. Judges focus
on one set of facts and the laws that might apply to it. Law teachers in America
assume the role of lawyers. Good lawmakers, on the other hand, must make provision for not one case, but for all possible cases, even though they well know
that they cannot anticipate all cases. Good lawmakers must capture in a few understandable words what they want people to do. Good lawmakers must make
their laws consistent internally and with other laws. John Austin saw that this
“the technical part of legislation, is incomparably more difficult than what may
be styled the ethical.84
In legislating Jefferson was building a government of laws. He was the
architect designing a new republic. His designs would demolish old law that was
81
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inapplicable, oppressive, contrary to republican sensibilities, or simply not welladapted to present time and circumstances as the Act creating the committee contemplated. Jefferson intended his designs to rationalize existing laws and institutions and to create new ones. They would create government, guide governors in
how to govern and instruct those governed in what was expected of them. He was
ripping out common law that he found feudal, offensive or just plain foolish.
Jefferson’s Revisal suggests no thought to using contemporary common
law methods of lawmaking to bring about the republic of his visions. To the contrary, the Revisal was legislation. Jefferson could hardly have proceeded in any
other way. Only statutes can root out old laws, refashion rationally remaining
institutions, create wholly new institutions, and provide direction in how to govern. Jefferson sought to use legislation to do all four.85 In a democratic republic
Jefferson could not decree judicially a new society and new laws. He had to get
the assent of the democratically-elected legislature.
The substance of Jefferson’s legislation.86 Historians focus—as did Jefferson himself—on the substance of his legislative work. His biographers take
from twenty-five to fifty pages to describe it. The bills of the Revisal alone were
printed in ninety oversized folio pages in tiny type (over three hundred pages in a
standard type face in a large octavo book). Other legislation he wrote or spon-
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sored was of comparable extent. He was, as the editor of his papers said, “a veritable legislative drafting bureau.”87
Jefferson worked to build a new society. He designed legislation that
struck at the very roots of the common law: the land law, inheritance and criminal law. According to one biographer, Jefferson intended to “completely overthrow the English legal system that had chained Virginia for 170 years.”88 Jefferson abolished primogeniture and completely changed rules of descent. He proposed a new penal law “to proportion crimes and punishments in cases [previously] capital.” It failed of passage by a single vote. Jefferson drafted legislation that
would end forever the idea that the common law made Christian doctrine a part
of law. His legislation disestablished the Anglican Church in Virginia. His bill
establishing religious liberty is the best-known of all his legislation.
Jefferson sought to organize and rationalize common law institutions.
His legislation restated and reorganized court institutions and procedures both
civil and criminal to make, writes one historian, a “mantel of procedural safeguards for all.”89
Jefferson’s legislation reorganize government in all its branches. It provided for a state militia and navy, a board of war, a board of trade and a board of
auditors. It districted the legislature and provided for elections and appointments.
It created a public land office to administer claims to the western lands.
Jefferson did not know how to treat slavery. He wanted to end it, but did
not know how politically he could. Today his legislative proposals look modestly
progressive at best and frighteningly racist at worst: gradual emancipation followed by mandatory emigration.90 His other legislation addressed all manner of
personal status, including slaves, indentured servants, mulattoes, citizens, and
aliens.
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Jefferson restated and rationalized a nascent regulatory state. His legislation addressed matters as diverse as infection and breeding of animals, licensing
and regulating taverns, regulating mill-dams, public store-houses, commodities
fraud, unwholesome meat and drink, public health vaccination and quarantine,
usury, gaming and what we would call unfair competition.
Jefferson worked at building what we might call a social state. His legislation provided for maintaining and building public roads, establishing ferries, a
state postal service, support of the poor, registration of vital statistics, and legal
aid in civil court proceedings.
Of all of his proposals for new legislation, Jefferson was most proud of
his bills for “the more general diffusion of knowledge.” Jefferson wanted to establish universal public schooling. His bill for public education was an American
model for a generation. He sought to establish a public research library, to reorganize the College of William and Mary and to establish the University of Virginia.
Jefferson’s dealing with statutes. Jefferson knew how to deal with statutes. Some of his best practices included:






91

Professional drafting. In Jefferson’s day legislatures acting as a body
generally drafted legislation within a single term of few months. The
Act that Jefferson wrote took the Revisal out of the normal legislative cycle and gave the work to experts. The Act explained why: “a
work of such magnitude, labor and difficulty, may not be effected
during the short and busy terms of a session of Assembly.”
Justifications for bills. In Jefferson’s day legislation usually began
simply, “be it enacted,” without explanation why. Jefferson, however, for his most important laws, prefaced them with elegant explanations, sometimes called proems, of the basis for the proposed legislation.91
Publication of the proposed legislation for public comment. Generally the Virginia legislature decided for itself the merits of proposed
legislation. In a day of difficult communication and transportation
and expensive printing, hardly any other course was conceivable. But
in the case of the Revisal, the legislature directed printing of the revisal. It allowed for a comment period of nine months. The Act authorizing printing explained why: “for the purpose of affording to the

See Lerner, supra note 53, at 90.
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citizens at large, an opportunity of examining and considering a work
which proposes such various and material changes in our legal
code.”92
Clarity of statutory language. Jefferson was aware of the need and
the difficulty of expressing legal rules in language that expresses
what is intended, while keeping all laws consistent with each other.
The very idea of a comprehensive revisal in written law shows that.
Jefferson sought to strike a balance between the old and the new in
his drafting. He wrote co-draftsman Wythe: Wythe, “In its style I
have aimed at accuracy, brevity and simplicity, preserving however
the very words of the established law, wherever their meaning has
been sanctioned by judicial decisions or rendered technical by usage.”93
Understandable. High quality legislation requires written law that
can be followed. His biographers—laymen—praise his language in
the penal bills as “a model of plain, elegant writing”94 and “comprehensible to laymen.”95

Jefferson’s legal state. Jefferson’s bills respecting education—although
not adopted in his day in Virginia—show Jefferson’s aspirations for laws that
would strike the right balance of defining the tasks of government and yet allowing the governors sufficient flexibility to govern well.
Government gives direction. Jefferson’s proposals give in detail how
schools shall be established. They set out not only what shall be done, but who
shall do it. “Electors” have their duties, “aldermen theirs,” and “overseers” theirs.
The latter are to appoint, and remove teachers, and to examine scholars. Summarizing Lerner observes:
Visitors of the grammar schools are charged with hiring and firing the master and steward of the school, setting tuition, and examining the school, its staff, and its students. Both the overseers
of the hundred and the visitors of the grammar schools are
charged with seeing to it that any general instructional plan rec92

As quoted in 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Volume 2, 1777 to 18 June 1779),
supra note 72, at 310.
93
Jefferson to Wythe, Nov 1, 1778, 2 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Volume 2, 1777
to 18 June 1779), supra note 72, at 229, 230.
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Randall, supra note 64, at 298.
95
Mallone, supra note 90, at 271.
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ommended by the visitors of William and Mary College shall be
observed. Teachers are accountable for their performance; just as
they are for their fidelity to the commonwealth; overseers are accountable for their recommendations and appointments; scholars
are accountable for making the best of whatever genius they
have. In short, the entire scheme for establishing and maintaining
an educational system constitutes in itself an education in responsible self-governance. In lavishing these details upon the
bill, Jefferson also gave his fullest explanation by example of
what he meant by self-government. … [A] free people must be
qualified ‘as judges of the actions and designs of men.’ Jefferson’s bill encompasses that intention at every level.”96
The ultimate judge of legislation is whether it works. Since much of what Jefferson wrote was not adopted and since much that was adopted addressed soon-tobe-obsolete matters, it is difficult to characterize how well his bills would have
worked. But some can be measured. One commentator singled out Jefferson’s
Statute of Descents of October 1775 a century later. That law “demolished” “every shred of the pre-existing (English) law of descents” and established new law
based on contradictory principles. Nonetheless, the admirer wrote: “So precise,
so comprehensive and exhaustive, so simple and clear, were the terms in which
they were expressed, that in the experience of a completed century but one single
doubt as to the construction and effect of any part of it has arisen.”97

6. Conclusion
Ten years ago Professor Charles Abernathy told a German audience of lawyers
and judges, that although they and their American counterparts might see the
roots of the American legal system in English common law and a common law
process of simultaneously making and applying law, “with respect to constitutional law—America’s greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule
of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not England.”98 I have suggested here that much the same might be said of American
lawmaking generally.
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In this contribution, I have not been concerned with where the ideas of
Adams and Jefferson came from, but where they might lead. Their government of
laws and not of men partakes more of a democratic legal state than it does of the
Dicey-like rule of law of the contemporary common law. Their state is a state
based on statutes adopted by democratic legislatures using procedures intended to
produce laws that promote the common good. Their statutes are well-crafted and
consistent within themselves and with other laws to the end that no one should be
forced to break one law in order to follow another. Their laws guide the people—the governed and governors alike—toward making good decisions based on
personal responsibility. Their directions are understandable and not obtuse. They
can be faithfully interpreted. They do not presume to decide all issues of their
application beforehand. They are a path to good government and to liberty in
law.

Kremp, ed., Atlantische Texte, vol. 19, 2003) at 37l. The occasion was the 100th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison. For classical roman law
ideas in the U.S. constitution, see David J. Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the
American Constitution: Prevailing Wisdom (2008); M.N.S. Sellers, American Republicanism: Roman Ideology in the United States Constitution (1994).
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